The Double Standard: Why Are Internet Governance Rules Different for Africa?

ICANN, Smart Africa, and the Question Everyone Is Avoiding

I have a question that has been troubling me. A question that goes to the heart of whether internet governance principles apply equally everywhere, or whether there is one set of rules for Europe, North, South America, and another set for Africa.

Would ICANN participate in, fund, and lend institutional credibility to a proposal for example, by the European Commission to restructure RIPE NCC through an intergovernmental framework that allows political endorsement to substitute for member ratification?

Would they do it for ARIN? For APNIC? For LACNIC?

If the answer is no, then we need to understand why the rules are different for Africa.

If the answer is yes, then ICANN needs to acknowledge explicitly that they are facilitating a fundamental transformation of the global RIR system from community governed technical coordination to politically mediated infrastructure management.

Either answer is a problem. But the silence is not good. perhaps even worse.

What is being proposed, because the technical language obscures the stakes;

Smart Africa an intergovernmental organisation of African heads of state (40 states). It has developed a “Continental Africa Internet Governance Architecture (CAIGA)” that would:

• Create a paid membership structure for internet governance participation (replacing open community process)

• Allow the Smart Africa Heads of State Summit to politically endorse AFRINIC governance reforms if the AFRINIC membership does not adopt them

• Install a Permanent Secretary “provided by the Smart Africa Secretariat” creating dual reporting mechanisms outside member oversight

• Enable governments to make recommendations directly to AFRINIC’s board, bypassing community policy development

• Create reform papers based on the sole participation of an adhoc committee excluding members

• Adopt a blue print drafted by a third party, based in France (this was presented at ICANN 84) with new bylaws proposed by an adhoc committee

Smart Africa’s meeting minutes describe “7 of 8 coalition backed candidates elected” as a “step toward stabilization” for the September 2025 AFRINIC board elections, this is top down political coordination, not bottom up community governance.

And ICANN participated in developing this framework. According to the 2024 ICANN/Smart Africa Memorandum of Understanding, the organisations agreed to “jointly identify, design and develop research projects…including but not limited to jointly collaborating on a reference document outlining a comprehensive strategy to enhance the involvement of various stakeholders (e.g., government actors) in the governance of Internet infrastructure.”

At ICANN84 in Dublin, Smart Africa announced this as “two years of joint work with ICANN.” ICANN provided financial support. ICANN participated in the working group that developed the framework.

A Pattern of Participation Without Accountability

ICANN’s involvement lends institutional legitimacy to CAIGA, allowing Smart Africa to claim collaboration with the global internet governance community. But if and when concerns are raised, ICANN can maintain distance by characterising their role as advisory or supportive rather than directive.

This is problematic, in that it is sophisticated institutional positioning, enough involvement to transfer credibility, enough distance to avoid accountability for the controversial elements.

According to Amin Dayekh, a member of AFRINIC in good standing, the community was not broadly consulted. The CAIGA presentation at the Africa Internet Summit in Accra came with 24 hours’ notice. Many AFRINIC members in good standing were not informed nor meaningfully engaged despite ICANN’s participation in developing the framework.

How does that ensure multistakeholder participation?

What Neutrality Should Look Like

ICANN has maintained that it has remained neutral in AFRINIC’s governance challenges. But participating in developing a governance restructuring proposal, providing financial support, allowing institutional association, while the affected community remains largely uninformed is not neutrality. It is choosing a side while maintaining plausible deniability.

Genuine neutrality would look like this;

“ICANN recognises Smart Africa’s interest in continental digital coordination. However, any governance restructuring of AFRINIC must be developed through AFRINIC’s own community processes in accordance with ICP-2. ICANN cannot participate in or fund external governance proposals that have not been requested by and developed with the affected RIR community. We encourage Smart Africa and AFRINIC’s community to engage directly.”

That is not what happened. Instead, ICANN participated in a working group, provided funding, and lent institutional credibility to a framework that creates mechanisms for political override of community decisions.

This Matters Beyond Africa

The RIR system; AFRINIC, APNIC, ARIN, LACNIC, RIPE NCC manages the internet’s addressing infrastructure globally. These organisations work because they are built on community trust and technical independence from governmental control.

The system works because the same principles apply everywhere; bottom up policy development, community self governance, insulation from political direction.

If those principles do not apply in Africa, if intergovernmental organisations can draft bylaws externally, coordinate electoral outcomes, and substitute political endorsement for member ratification then the precedent affects the global system.

Would Russia propose a Eurasian Internet Governance Architecture for RIPE NCC?

Would China propose an Asia Pacific framework for APNIC?

Would the US propose a Western Hemisphere structure for ARIN and LACNIC?

Once you accept that government led restructuring of RIR governance is legitimate in one region, you have opened the door everywhere.

ICANN should answer directly to this

Would you participate in and provide financial support for say the European Commission, ASEAN, or the Organisation of American States to restructure RIPE NCC, APNIC, or LACNIC through intergovernmental frameworks that allow political endorsement to substitute for member ratification?

If no, why are the rules different for Africa?

Is it because African institutions are assumed to need external intervention? Because African community governance is seen as less capable? Because “stabilisation” justifies processes that would be unacceptable elsewhere?

This is paternalism with a multistakeholder facade, not solidarity.

If yes.

If ICANN would participate in similar governmental restructuring anywhere then say so explicitly. Acknowledge that you are facilitating a fundamental transformation of how internet infrastructure is governed globally.

No need to hide behind “working group membership” and “financial support” while claiming neutrality.

What Development and Sovereignty Actually Require

African governments have legitimate interests in digital infrastructure. Digital sovereignty is real. Development needs are urgent.

But those interests do not require and are not served by undermining the bottom up governance model that has enabled the internet’s success.

We can have African digital sovereignty AND community governed technical institutions. We can have governmental policy coordination AND independent registry operations. We can have continental infrastructure strategies AND bottom up multistakeholder processes.

But political bodies substituting their approval for community ratification and calling it multistakeholder governance is not right.

The African Union has important roles to play in digital policy. Smart Africa can convene governments around infrastructure investment. National regulators have legitimate oversight functions.

But drafting AFRINIC bylaws externally? Coordinating board electoral outcomes? Creating mechanisms for political endorsement to override member decisions? That is not policy coordination, it is governance capture.

The Precedent We Are Setting

In 2011, I chaired the UN Internet Governance Forum in Nairobi. We worked hard to ensure that African voices were not just present but central to global internet governance debates.

Not African governments only. Not intergovernmental organisations only, but African civil society, African technical community, African businesses, African academics, African internet users.

That is multistakeholder. That is bottom up. That is what makes internet governance legitimate.

CAIGA proposes something different; continental representation through governmental structures, paid membership replacing open participation, political endorsement substituting for community ratification.

If that becomes the model if that is what “African internet governance” means  then we have failed.

Not failed to be represented at global tables. Failed to protect the very principles that made those tables worth sitting at in the first place.

We need

• Transparency about ICANN’s full involvement in developing CAIGA not just “working group membership” but the scope of participation and financial support.

• Explicit assessment of CAIGA’s compatibility with ICP-2 and the RIR governance principles that apply to RIPE NCC, ARIN, APNIC, and LACNIC.

• Answer to the direct question: Would ICANN support similar governmental restructuring of RIRs in other regions? If not, justification for why different standards apply to African internet governance.

• Commitment that any AFRINIC governance reforms will be developed through AFRINIC’s own community processes, not external drafting with political endorsement mechanisms.

Several of us have spent a lot of time working for African digital inclusion, African policy leadership, African technical capacity.

And defending multistakeholder principles, not because they are Western, but because they work. Not because they are perfect, but because they are better than the alternatives.

We should not trade multistakeholder governance for continental representation through governmental structures.

We should not accept that African institutions need different standards of community governance than European or Asian, or American ones.

“stabilisation” and “development”  should not justify processes that would be called capture anywhere else.

We should not let ICANN’s participation in this be laundered through language about “working groups” and “financial support” without asking whether they would  do the same thing for RIPE NCC, or the other RIRs.

We can have legitimate continental coordination on digital infrastructure through appropriate governmental and intergovernmental channels.

We can have AFRINIC governed by its community through bottom up processes that protect technical independence.

We can have both. We should have both.

What we cannot have, what we must not accept is governmental restructuring of technical governance presented as multistakeholder reform.

The evidence of this pattern is mounting. The documentation is comprehensive. The concerns are real.

So why are the rules different for Africa? And what does ICANN’s participation in creating that double standard say about their commitment to global governance principles?

Waiting for Answers!

Alice Munyua is an independent internet governance expert. She chaired the 2011 UN Internet Governance Forum in Nairobi, served as chair of the Kenya ccTLD (.ke), on the board of the Communications Authority of Kenya, and on ICANN’s Governmental Advisory Committee. She has worked in internet governance for over two decades across government, civil society, tech and the private sector.